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Abstract
This paper studies the innovation strategy of Russian Railways, the biggest transport company in the world. Russian 
Railways has chosen a strategy of international science, technology and innovation (STI) cooperation outside their own 
network. This strategy is a novel approach for Russian State-owned enterprises (SOE). Based on the analysis of innovation 
development program and interviews with managers, the paper studies the company’s experience with the chosen 
strategy. Thereby, the paper enhances the understanding of innovation processes in major public service companies which 
are crucial for the socio-economic processes inside and outside national boundaries.
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Introduction
The expansion of the knowledge base is vital for sustainable 
economic growth (see papers in endogenous growth 
literature like Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1990). Such 
knowledge generation processes are mostly a collective 
action involving a wide number of heterogeneous actors 
(e.g. Roy, Sivakumar and Wilkinson 2004) and provide 
companies with an efficient way to upgrade products 
or services in an ever faster changing technological 
environment (Nelson and Winter, 1982, von Hippel 1988; 
Rosenberg, 1994; Niosi 1999). 
The innovation literature to this day focuses heavily on 
knowledge flows along one’s own value chain (customers, 
users, competitors and suppliers) (Chesbrough 2003; 
Gassmann 2006; Laursen and Salter 2006; Piller and Walcher 
2006). Such positions turn a blind eye on the importance 
of the heterogeneity of knowledge sources for innovation 
performance (Porter 1990; Prahalad and Hamel 1990; 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1994). Previous contributions 
mention the gap on knowledge coming from outside existing 
networks (see, for example, Enkel and Gassmann 2010), 
especially as a tool to overcome transnational differences 
by accumulating experience in cross-border collaboration 
(Barkema et al. 1997). Such knowledge transfer processes are 
not an easy task though. Firms rely on sufficient absorptive 
capacity when cooperating with external partners. To achieve 
the necessary sophistication, in-house R&D units need to 
cooperate on a very high level (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
History is full of companies which once were technology 
leaders, but over time fell behind and struggled to find their 
position in an ever-changing environment (Here, Kodak 
serves as a recent example). Most contributions study the 
capabilities required in order to remain competitive in 
rapidly changing industries (Leonard-Barton 1992; Teece 
et al. 1997; Teece 2007; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Zollo 
and Winter 2002; Wang and Ahmed 2007) or factors for 
sustaining corporate success and continual renewal and 
innovation (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). What is absent 
is research on the catch-up process of large companies 
to regain the position of technology leadership. These 
companies have two strategy choices: engage in own R&D or 
acquire best technologies and imitate new products. The last 
option often appears in the literature as ‘imitation strategy’ 
(Schewe 1996) and has actively been discussed in line with 
a nation’s technology catch-up processes. See, for example, 
Mansfield (1988) on Japanese advantage on innovations 
based on external technologies, Chiang (1989), Chen (2009) 
on Taiwan, Dobson and Safarian (2008) on China, Amsden 
(1989), Choi (1989) or Kim (1997) on Korea.
This paper studies innovation in Russian Railways, the 
world’s largest transport company. It gives insights into the 
organizational structures and the technology management 
processes through which Russian Railways returned from 
simple high-tech imports to being a source of technological 
growth and development for Russia. This paper also provides 
a rare opportunity to study innovation management 
processes in public service companies. The low number 
of contributions discussing these companies is surprising, 
as they provide services for large parts of a country’s 
population. The paper by Malagas et al. (2013) in this journal 
is a noteworthy exception. These social innovations, that 
directly influence living standards of the population, might 
be more urgent for the developing countries than high-
technology products exported abroad. Additionally, service 
companies may act as important producers for innovations 
(the way Russian Railways does) stimulating local innovation 
activities. 
Research question and methodology
Innovation management and international R&D cooperation 
of Russian SOEs have largely remained a mystery. In the 
recent years, the innovation development programs of 
Russian SOEs shed light on their strategies and processes. 
The initiative was launched in August 2010 and serves as the 
preferred policy tool of the Russian government to stimulate 
the innovation activities of the 47 largest SOEs3 whose 
overall share in the Russian industrial turnover accounted 
for more than 20%.4  
In addition, the working group on Private-Public Partnership 
Development in innovation was created which included 
representatives from the government, ministries, corporations, 
universities, and the Russian Academy of Sciences to make 
tactical decisions on innovation strategies of SOEs.5 These 
innovation strategies include new product development, 
modernization of equipment, commercialization of 
technologies, cooperation with universities, R&D institutions 
and SMEs, participation in Russian technology platforms, 
and international collaborations. 
313 companies were added to the existing list in 2012.
4Over one third of these SOEs belong to the defence industry.
5Since 2012 this function has been performed by the Interministerial 
Commission on Technological Development under the Presidium 
of the Presidential Council for Economic Modernization and 
Innovative Development.
159
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2014, Volume 9, Issue 3
thousand km of railway lines in the Russian Federation 
(more than half of Russia’s railway tracks are electrified) 
requires regular modernization of railway infrastructure. 
Wear and tear of equipment means a large-scale need for 
replacement of contact wires and suspension cables. Here, 
innovative processes could make a major impact on the 
cost structure of the company. Hence, the national railway 
transport development strategy identified at least $ 5119.5 
billion rubles of investment needs for the period 2008-
2015 and $ 6328.3 billion rubles for 2016-2030 for the 
modernization and development of the infrastructure and 
rolling stock. The Russian Railways’ share should reach about 
a half of this spending.7 
Also, transport management is a weak point. More than 
2000 rail carriers operate all over Russia (mostly affiliated 
to large state-owned companies or independent). Often, idle 
wagons are left somewhere on the tracks, which cannot be 
used for other transport. 
 
Russian Railways recently initiated a number of innovation 
projects. Their in-house R&D units, national and international 
collaboration and the help of their research and technology 
organizations enabled the company to successfully 
introduced innovations like:
• compressed natural gas turbines
• automatic driving system of high-speed trains with power 
saving functions
• traffic control technology based on intelligent systems, 
including advanced time management
• Satellite status monitoring technology infrastructure 
• Security technology work stations on based on digital 
models of the way and satellite navigation.
• Technology interval traffic control based on track circuits 
Very few Russian SOEs actually access knowledge and 
technologies through international collaboration, and the 
number of companies using high-end developments in their 
production processes is even smaller. Russian Railways, 
the world’s largest transport organization, struggles with 
outdated physical infrastructure and needed to find a quick 
solution to close their widening technology gap. Despite 
the company’s history of a innovation initiator and the 
company’s far reaching mission of increasing the country’s 
level of production, its technology gap which opened up 
since the late 1980s needed immediate attention. The 
company also has a high social responsibility and is an 
instigator of economic development. Besides partnerships 
with Russian companies, Russian Railways has chosen a 
strategy of international science, technology and innovation 
(STI) cooperation outside their own network. Their way 
to regain initiatives over its innovation activities provides 
a unique opportunity to study if and how Russian SOEs 
can benefit from both knowledge transfer and common 
knowledge creation with international technology leaders. 
The paper is based on the analysis of the innovation 
development program of Russian Railways and interviews 
with company’s top-managers responsible for technology 
and innovation. Interviews lasted 45 min to one hour. 
About the company: Russian Railways
Russian Railways is the largest transport company in the 
world with over 1 billion passengers, 1.3 billion tons of cargo 
per year and about 1 million employees. Also the railway 
net is among the largest in the world and accounts for 
85% of freight transport in the country (excluding pipeline 
transportation). Due to Russia’s sheer size, it still lacks a 
well-developed road system, and large parts of its population 
rely on the Railway for passenger and goods transport. With 
shipment volume ever increasing between the advanced 
economies in Europe and the growing emerging markets 
in South-East Asia, Russian Railways is perfectly situated 
to benefit greatly from the need of fast and reliable good 
transport between these countries. The company shares are 
held by the government of the Russian Federation.
Over its long history, Railways in Russia went through 
turbulent times. Historically, Russian Railways was initiating 
innovation processes by requesting their preferred 
manufacturers to deliver solutions for described problems 
(e.g. CJSC Transmashholding,6  Rostec State Corporation). 
Due to the importance of Russian Railways for Russia’s 
development, its mission was to a large extent on stimulating 
the local production. Starting from the late 1980s though, 
maintenance and investment in innovative transport 
solutions were strongly neglected. Also, maintaining the 
capital-intensive infrastructure is very costly. The 85 
625% plus 1 share of CJSC Transmashholding belong to Russian 
Railways, another 25% plus 1 share is owned by Alstom. The rest of 
the shares are controlled by other Russian structures,
7This is without compensating for the cut-backs in investment 
during the economic crisis of 2008-2009.
160
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2014, Volume 9, Issue 3
Since the start of the program in 2011, the bulk of the 
planned indicators of its effectiveness has been achieved. 
Problematic has proven the set of indicators on delivering 
within scheduled time or average speed of delivery of the 
consignment. Here, the company identified the slow turnover 
of freight cars largely due to activities of private carriers as 
their main problem. The company reports annually on the 
implementation of innovative development program to the 
Ministry of Economic Development of Russia.
The company is successfully tackling technology areas 
like control systems and traffic safety steel satellite 
technology in collaboration with Russian-based GLONASS. 
Moreover, innovation activities are carried out in close 
scientific cooperation with universities, institutions of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, academic institutions, public 
corporations, the business community. Areas of critical 
technologies where the development gaps will not be easily 
closed through cooperation with existing partners require 
the transfer of technology from leading international 
and domestic companies. The major point here was the 
development of innovative rolling stock. 
Russia’s motor engineering has once been among the finest 
in the world, but fell behind during the 1980s. Today, Russian 
Railways still relies on the Russian diesel-electric engine 
D-49, produced and modified for over 40 years.  Now, 
further incremental improvements are no longer feasible as 
the design is outdated. 
“Look at our old D-49 Russian diesel engine. 40 years old, 
always modified to improve the engine. But there is nothing 
to squeeze out anymore.  It’s an old machine! Look, 40 years 
ago asynchronous traction motors were the latest thing. 
Now they are old. We have studied all of these engines, but 
the fact is that until recently, we could not build a reliable 
asynchronous traction motor ourselves.” 
Especially the energy efficiency of its hardware is a topic 
of great interest, given that over 6% of Russia’s energy 
production is consumed by locomotives. Hence, it is 
the company’s top priority to reduce specific energy 
consumption.8 Here, the most prominent success story is 
the introduction of the power turbine engine GT1h. Its 8500 
kW gas turbine power is well-suited for non-electrified 
tracks in Siberia and the Far North to economically 
transport freight. Its operational costs are lower than 
traditional diesel fuel. Should the turbine fail, the locomotive 
still caries enough own energy through a battery for 80km 
at a speed of 50km/h. Furthermore, the use of gas-powered 
Innovation management of russian railways 
The company’s innovation strategy includes twelve priority 
areas: transportation management system, infrastructure, 
rolling stock, control system and traffic safety, disaster 
risk reduction, increased reliability and increase service 
life, high-speed and high-speed traffic, corporate quality 
management system, improving economic and energy 
efficiency, environmental protection, technical regulation, 
the introduction of innovative satellite and GIS technologies. 
However, special importance is given to projects that meet 
government priorities. Here, improving energy efficiency of 
the hardware is of great importance. 
The innovation management system at Russian Railways had 
to become integrated into the corporate decision support 
system. Here, a major challenge of introducing a capable 
innovation management was to align the different planning 
levels, intellectual property management policies and the 
establishment of clear chain of command. The latter point 
is of prominent importance as management at different 
levels collaborates with the company’s many partners. Here, 
ownership of projects were ascribed to key executives and 
competence centers. 
Russian Railways formulates its strategic directions in an 
annual plan based on trends in science and technology, basic 
and applied research (mostly new technologies applied in 
other companies), feasibility studies, long-term development 
plans and prototypes. This planning activity involves all levels 
of management of the company, subdivisions, subsidiaries 
and third parties. The company created the position of the 
Head of Research and Technology for the group in charge of 
implementing the company’s very own innovation program. 
The position is assisted by the department of technical 
policies which is in charge of the execution of the outlined 
development and gathering of intelligence. The department 
works closely with regional innovation development centers 
which were established in 2009. The company now holds 
weekly meetings on various aspects of innovation to quickly 
make joint decisions on important issues for the company.
To find a common language, Russian Railways agreed on a 
number of indicators which should monitor the company’s 
progress. Top among these indicators rank energy efficiency 
measures in line with the Energy Strategy. Next rank 
indicators for the efficient deployment of fixed assets, 
the renewal of the locomotive fleet, but also the specific 
amount of traffic accidents or indicators for environmental 
performance (e.g. reducing the load on the environment, air 
emissions and wastewater discharges).
8It seems unrealistic for the company to reduce energy consumption 
in absolute terms as the new rails built are being electrified.
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contracted and started to change form. The Italian producer 
could not provide a solution and there was a need for a new 
wheel. As a starting point, the original wheels were changed 
on the ones from decommissioned Russian trains while a 
team of Russian and German scientists began working on 
the new wheels. 
What started off like a simple purchase order from 
an international company turned into a multi-staged 
collaborative innovation process. After a period of 
experimentation, a reliable solution to the problem was 
found. These common research efforts resulted in the 
registration of not less than 26 joint patents. The high 
occupations rates of over 80% proved the high speed train 
connection to be very successful.
The automatic train control system that Russian Railways 
uses is in turn entirely of Russian origin. It is very precise, 
although Russia is the only country where high-speed trains 
move within the same track as local trains and freight trains. 
 ‘I would say that our automatic train control systems are to 
some extent better than in Europe. Russian high-speed trains 
don’t arrive late as they do in Europe’). The control system is 
entirely Russian. The only thing we did not buy is our control 
system - our brains so to say. The control system on trains 
is based on our satellite communication system and thereby 
entirely different to the European solution.  Here, we don’t 
lag behind. In fact, we even surpass Europe. Our trains are 
very much on time! They always run on dedicated lines”. 
Second step – an international event  
fast forwards innovation
With Siemens, Russian Railways successfully partnered with 
a technology leader. The cooperation was further facilitated 
by good relations between the governments of Russia 
and Germany. A logical consequence was extending this 
cooperation with Siemens into modernizing local passenger 
trains, which no longer served their purpose. In 2009 
Russian Railways and Siemens signed a contract for 38 new 
German-produced trains for the Olympic Games in Sochi. 
This time, the collaboration should reach a more integrated 
manufacturing level. These trains should be produced locally 
and technology transfer to Russia should be part of the deal. 
“The Germans were willing to share their technology. 
Others did not show the same intentions. This was one 
of the reasons why we decided to go with Siemens. Now, 
everything is agreed and validated by the two parties. In 
2014, 35% of the train will be produced in Russia, and the 
remaining part in Germany. Scientists and engineers now 
work together. But we also have to focus on the economic 
side of the project”. 
locomotives reduces emissions by the factor 4 – which 
provides special advantages in major cities. In recent years, 
Russian railcars improved their technical performance, with 
increased axle load (25 ton or more) and resources that 
allow for increasing the mileage between depot repairs to 
500 thousand kilometers. Despite all of these innovations, 
Russian Railways intended to establish high-speed railway 
lines between its major cities. Such expertise though were 
not to be found within its own network. 
First step – joining the high-speed club
In Russia’s west, population density is relatively high and big 
cities are very populous. The area is flat and very well suited 
for high-speed trains. Russian Railways was considering 
developing such a train by itself, but decided that it is not 
worth the effort. 
“If we would have started to design such a train from scratch, 
it would have taken us 10 - 15 years. We are hopelessly 
behind, and investing everything anew would make sure we 
would never catch up”. 
Instead, a quick upgrade of the hardware was necessary. 
The additional cash-flow generated can then be used to 
finance other innovation projects. In order to increase 
the technology level, Russian Railways screened for best 
practices all over the world and studied them in great depth. 
After a call for interest, Siemens was chosen to be the most 
suitable provider. The first contract was signed on May 18 
2006 between Russian Railways and Siemens over eight high-
speed trains (Eur 276m) and a 30-year service contract (Eur 
300m). Based on the design of the ICE3, the trains “Sapsan” 
(peregrine falcon) provide space for 600 passengers and 
connected first Moscow to Saint Petersburg and since July 
2010 Moscow to Nizhny Novgorod. The train’s engines 
operate on 3 KV DC and 25 kV 50Hz AC and the gauges 
were adjusted to the 13 inch Russian standard. After the first 
test phase, tough, it became clear that the ICE3 was not fully 
suitable to Russia’s harsh climate conditions. 
“The first time we tested the trains in winter, it was not 
really cold. But then, temperature fell below -30. Tracks 
began to form, by 5 mm sometimes. The wheels they 
used so far were completely unsuitable. Together, we 
had to find a solution… This was a quite complicated 
process. First, we had to establish the weaknesses of the 
current design. Then, our scientists and engineers worked 
intensively with Siemens”
As described, the doors didn’t close due to heavy snow-fall. 
A second – probably much more severe problem – arose 
when temperature started to fall below -40 degrees C. The 
wheels could adjust to slight movements of the tracks which 
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For this project, Russian Railways attempt to co-develop 
new diesel engines and use it on local platforms. In 2012, 
Russian Railways placed an order with JSC Transmashholding 
to supply 10 Russian-produced locomotives equipped with 
diesel engines of MTU Friedrichshafen GmbH (Germany). By 
the end of 2015 an engineering centre will be established to 
design new diesel engines and manage the whole production 
cycle of diesel engines in Russia. This new engineering centre 
will focus on the transfer of specific technologies from 
more than one supplier. For example, the company Knorr 
will provide break systems and establish a joint venture with 
JSC ‘Federal Freight’ (a subsidiary of Russian Railways) to 
manufacture and maintain break equipment for locomotives 
and other rail transport.
The probably most innovative project of Russian Railways 
targets the development of ‘smart stations’ including 
automatic maintenance systems. Such smart stations are 
established in Germany and other countries, and Russian 
Railways attempts to use the experience of Deutsche 
Bahn. To finance its implementation, the company struggles 
to receive 50 million Euros from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Also, the construction 
of high-speed railway lines (HSRL) – from Moscow to 
St. Petersburg (HSRL 1 Project) and from Moscow to 
Kazan (and further to Ekaterinburg) is in planning.11 The 
construction of HSRL will allow travel four times faster from 
Moscow to Kazan and seven times faster from Moscow to 
Nizhniy Novgorod. Its commercial viability still needs to 
be proven. Considering the low level of salaries in Kazan 
and Nizhniy Novgorod, questions remain about demand 
for high price railway tickets. 
Analysis of STI cooperation of Russian Railways 
The move towards partnering with Siemens was not easily 
made. The primary port of call was with their previous 
suppliers of equipment. Unfortunately, these producers 
were not up to the technology that Russian Railways was 
seeking and most likely could not meet the requirements.
Step-by-step, the Russian contribution to the train will 
increase and should reach 80% of local manufacturing 
by 2017.9 For this purpose the Russian group Sinara and 
Siemens AG set up the joint venture Ural locomotives in 
2011 in Verhniaya Pyshma (Russia). Again here, the company 
developed a new version of Siemens’ Desiro train, the 
Desiro RUS. The electric commuter train based on the 
1520 mm broad gauge was called Lastochka (Swallow). A 
newly created engineering centre facilitates technological 
innovations and technology transfer. The first 18 trains were 
put in service in January 2013. 
One serious obstacle to replacing old local trains depends 
on regional budgets, which might not be enough for the 
moment to purchase the new trains and Russian Railways 
hopes for substantial support from federal funds. In 2014 
Russian Railways plan a further purchase of 16 trains 
manufactured in Russia which will replace the currently 
used local trains.
“The ones for Sochi are already purchased and paid. That’s 
national budget. For other purchases, we talk about regional 
funds. And as soon as it is from the regional budgets, their 
decision makers are ready to buy cheap chunk…”
Third step – the future
Another major impulse for improvements of the equipment 
comes from new developments of raw material deposits. 
In the rather highly populated west, electricity supply is 
well-developed. In the vast majority of the country, though, 
diesel engines are of vital importance. For heavy transport, 
the over 40 year old D49 is still in use but requires 
replacement. As the D49 is highly inefficient, there was 
increasing public support for the manufacturing of new 
generation diesel engines.10 
“Now they found Coal in the Amur region. This could give a 
positive impulse as the coal will have to be transported. Our 
locomotive production is a problem. Asynchronous motors 
are fine, but we need a new diesel engine”!
9Of course, such cooperation is still profitable for Siemens, because 
Russian Railways will have to acquire components for trains from 
Germany.
10A specific subprogram in the Federal targeted programme 
‘National technological base’ (The Russian Government order of 
April 21, 2011 N710-r).
11Information agency RZD partner.com (http://www.rzd-partner.
com/). According to the survey, conducted by the sociological 
company ‘The Public Opinion Foundation’, such projects are 
in great demand. They are supported by 86% respondents from 
Kazan, 79% from Moscow, 78% from Nizhniy Novgorod, and 72% 
from Saint Petersburg.
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Here, the government involvement into the company offered 
relief. The political relationship between the two countries 
played a facilitating role when negotiating such large R&D 
projects. Therefore, cooperations between Russian Railways 
and Siemens have been made possible only through the 
good relationship between the President of Russia and the 
Chancellor of Germany. A model train has been developed 
by both Russian Railways and Siemens which now travels 
across Russia which had a very strong promoting effect. 
Thereby, Russian Railways also appeals to young talent in 
the regions to join their workforce (‘When seeing such 
a modern train young people become willing to work in 
Russian Railways’).
As described earlier, these expenditures on new technology 
and its adjustment are pushing the company to its limit, with 
the consequence that building new (or reconstruction of 
old) railway tracks for the Baikal-Amur Mainline (Baikalo-
Amurskaya magistral, BAM) and Trans-Siberian Railway 
(Transsibirskaya Magistral) is already very difficult. Large 
amounts of goods (including coal) require transport to 
customers inside the country. After long debates, the 
company managed to convince government to co-fund 
these projects when the Presidency of Russia announced 
the investment priority of ‘infrastructure projects that pay’. 
This is very much in line with the experience of the Sapsan 
trains, which generate immediate income streams. 
“People don’t understand how railways in Russia operate. A 
lot of information is in the media, which is not always right. 
We would need more money…” 
To master the new demands on their equipment, Russian 
Railways is now developing new diesel locomotives and 
carrier wagons. To do so, the company now switched to an 
open innovation paradigm and invites different contributors 
in. This was largely facilitated through the prior positive 
experiences.12
“So, we are looking to develop different technologies like 
break systems. This is also a joint development. We need 
these breaks for freight trains. The information about various 
projects are openly available. Not just with the German 
partners.” 
“Previously, if these were not met, the order still went to the 
best proposal. This procedure was no longer good enough 
for Russian Railways. We needed to put more pressure on 
the producers. We put a call up to make clear that if our 
Russian producers cannot deliver, we’ll buy them in Germany 
or in France. However, you can’t simply buy locomotives. You 
have to make them fit for Russia!”
Russian Railways made it clear that they were willing 
to break with practices and leave their well-established 
innovation chain. It was no longer necessary to pick the 
best local producer, but you could now shop around. Still, 
simply buying the technology is not possible, but the use of 
the hardware in Russia needs adjustments. This was initially 
an expensive necessity, but turned into a much welcomed 
source of new knowledge. 
“For us, we prefer to buy the technology. This technology 
though is not readily available. Therefore, we have to 
develop the technology further. The more components we 
can use that have already been developed, the better it is. 
With such cooperations, we can at least increase the speed 
of development. Still, we have to bear the cost. And such 
developments are expensive”. 
This necessity to adjust technologies to the Russian 
environment also excluded the possibility of buying a license. 
An innovation manager explains:
“Most of these technologies have been developed by 
companies that don’t belong to us. Though, as we are big, 
we could initiate the innovation process by specifying the 
technical requirements for the locomotives… We could also 
have simply bought the license. The problem, though, is that 
improvements on these technologies belong to the owner. 
Hence, we needed the rights. Good engineers find it easy 
to communicate with each other. They clear problems fairly 
quickly as they arise”. 
The move towards collaboration on R&D management was 
almost forced upon Russian Railways as Siemens did not 
have a solution readily at hand. As the classical and - so to say 
- standardized channels of knowledge transfer were off the 
table, alternative methods had to be found in negotiations 
on R&D collaboration. The formal R&D collaboration was 
agreed upon in the second series of collaboration. Such 
negotiations are long and take up a lot of time. For the 
development of the Desiro RUS train: in 2009 an agreement 
was signed to procure 38 German made trains; half a year 
later a memorandum was signed to jointly produce and 
service trains in Russia; in September 2010 the contract for 
the procurement of 16 Russian-made trains was finalized; a 
year later the joint venture was started in Verhniaya Pyshma 
(Russia). Thus, it is a long process, and for each stage the 
profitability is under scrutiny.
12150 billion rubles for that purpose will come from the National 
Welfare Fund which is a part of Federal budget supposed to co-
finance pension savings of population and to support Pension 
Fund of Russia. http://press.rzd.ru/smi/public/ru?STRUCTURE_
ID=2&layer_id=5050&refererLayerId=5050&id=282391 
[Accessed July 15, 2014].
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Among specific problems, Russian Railways mention 
difficulties with the technology transfer in collaborating with 
foreign partners. International partners have limited interest 
in sharing their technologies with emerging economies 
(‘Nobody wants to sell its technologies to the those who 
lag far behind’). Typically, foreign companies sell licenses on 
the usage of technology without allowing modification. For a 
buyer, such acquisitions are of limited use, as the technology 
needs to be adapted to local conditions. Hence it is crucial 
to gain beneficial negotiations including the exchange 
of specialists in IP and engineers. This will result in a risk 
reduction for both parties.
Conclusions
The paper was initiated through the authors’ interest in 
innovation processes in Russian SOE. While most of them 
struggle to close the widening technology gap, this paper 
presented the experience of Russian Railways. The successful 
international STI cooperation of Russian Railways is untypical 
for Russia’s SOE. Instead of investing in own R&D, the company 
is acquiring technology which allows the introduction of 
state-of-the-art transport services. The necessary need to 
adjust the technology to the Russian environment started 
a learning process in innovation management. The example 
shows that the fear of dependence on foreign components 
producers is only partly justified. Undoubtedly, innovative 
development usually takes time and money, and the success 
is not always secured. The price of this strategy maybe high, 
but it triggers a wave of new developments. 
We identified the following methodology in Russian Railways’ 
strategy, which other companies might find useful: 
1. Identification of a starting project with high commercial 
potential and limited innovation capacity. 
2. Positive experiences and established partnerships are the 
starting ground for further development. Here now, the 
gradual localization of technological processes inside the 
country, including the set-up of joint ventures are a viable 
option. 
3. Embedding best technological solutions, giving priority to 
high-end technologies in most areas, allows bridging the gap 
between technology leaders and followers. 
4. Focusing on several big socially important projects may 
help to get additional government funding and support, and 
win the trust of people.
Basing on authors’ own observations and the analysis of 
available information, additional recommendations might be 
mentioned how to improve a company’s innovative strategy. 
Many Russian SOE struggle with embedding innovation into 
business processes. The innovation development program 
of Russian Railways is much focused on technological 
part, and innovation is understood as a separate activity 
disconnected from other company’s processes.13  At the 
same time, business processes at Russian Railways have 
many bottlenecks (over-centralization of management, 
expensive and out-of-time procurement of products and 
components, lack of coordination between departments, 
outdated regulatory documents and norms, huge amounts 
of reporting documentation). These problems are to 
great extent interconnected and derive from the existing 
organisational structure and management culture. Also, in 
Russian SOE, there is a systemic problem with motivating 
people. In Soviet times, working at the railway was perceived 
by people as a privilege. Now there are urgent problems in staff 
motivation. Firstly, young talented workers see the employer 
as unappealing, which leads to a widening generation gap and 
interferes with experience transfer, high pressure on lower 
level managers and a non-stimulating work environment. 
Despite the downsides, the emergence of a more innovative 
culture will solve most of the aforementioned problems.
This paper gives in inside view on Russian Railways’ 
innovation strategy and derives universal advice for other 
SOEs. We hope that this in-depth case study will trigger 
further research on similar corporations to allow for a 
comparative approach to innovation strategies from outside 
the very unique Russian environment. 
13This can be observed from the goals of innovation strategy (part 
2 of the innovation development program). http://rzd.ru/static/
public/ru?STRUCTURE_ID=666 [Accessed July 15, 2014].
165
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2014, Volume 9, Issue 3
Acknowledgements
Support from the Basic Research Program of the National 
Research University Higher School of Economics is gratefully 
acknowledged.
References
AGHION, P., HOWITT, P. (1990). A model of growth through 
creative destruction (No. w3223). National Bureau of 
Economic Research.
AMSDEN, A. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late 
Industrialization. Oxford University Press, New York. 
BARKEMA, H. G., Shenkar, O., Vermeulen, F. and Bell, J. H. 
(1997). Working abroad, working with others: How firms 
learn to operate international joint ventures. Academy of 
Management journal, 40(2), pp. 426-442.
BROWN, S. L., Eisenhardt, K. M. (1997). The art of continuous 
change: Linking complexity theory and time-paced evolution 
in relentlessly shifting organizations. Administrative science 
quarterly, 42, pp. 1-34.
CHEN, L.-Ch. (2009). Learning through informal local and 
global linkages: The case of Taiwan’s machine tool industry. 
Research Policy, 38(3), pp. 527-535.
CHESBROUGH, H. W. (2003). Open innovation: The new 
imperative for creating and profiting from technology. 
Harvard Business Press.
CHIANG, J.-T. (1989). Technology and alliance strategies 
for follower countries. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 35(4), pp. 339-349.
CHOI, D., Valikangas, L. (2001). Patterns of strategy innovation. 
European Management Journal, 19(4), pp. 424-429.
COHEN, W. M., Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: a 
new perspective on learning and innovation. Administrative 
science quarterly, 35(1), pp. 128-152.
DOBSON, W., Safarian, A.E. (2008). The transition from 
imitation to innovation: An enquiry into China’s evolving 
institutions and firm capabilities. Journal of Asian Economics, 
19(4), pp. 301-311.
EISENHARDT, K. M., Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: 
what are they? Strategic management journal, 21(10-11), pp. 
1105-1121.
ENKEL, E., Gassmann, O. (2010). Creative imitation: exploring 
the case of cross‐industry innovation. R&D Management, 
40(3), pp. 256-270.
GASSMANN, O. (2006). Opening up the innovation process: 
towards an agenda. R&D Management, 36(3), pp. 223-228.
HAGEDOORN, J., Schakenraad, J. (1994). The effect of 
strategic technology alliances on company performance. 
Strategic management journal, 15(4), pp. 291-309.
KIM, L. (1997). Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of 
Korea’s Technological Learning. Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston.
LAURSEN, K., Salter, A. (2006). Open for innovation: the role 
of openness in explaining innovation performance among 
UK manufacturing firms. Strategic management journal, 
27(2), pp. 131-150.
LEONARD-BARTON, D. (1992). Core capabilities and core 
rigidities: A paradox in managing new product development. 
Strategic management journal, 13, pp. 111-125.
MALAGAS, K., Kourousis, K., Baxter, G., Nikitakos, N., 
Gritzalis, S. (2013). The Introduction of Innovative Services 
in a State Owned Airline: A Case Study of an IT Migration 
Project, Journal of Technology Management and Innovation, 
8(2), pp. 74-83.
MANSFIELD, E. (1988). Industrial R&D in Japan and the 
United States: A comparative study. The American Economic 
Review, 78(2), pp. 223-228.
NELSON, R.R., Winter, S.G. (1982). An Evolutionary 
Model of Economic Change. Cambridge. Mass: Harvard 
University Press.
NIOSI, J. (1999). The Internationalization of Industrial RD-Fr. 
Research Policy, 28(2), pp. 107-118.
PILLER, F. T., Walcher, D. (2006). Toolkits for idea competitions: 
a novel method to integrate users in new product 
development. R&D management, 36(3), pp. 307-318.
PRAHALAD, C. K., Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence 
of the corporation. Boston (MA).
ROMER, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. 
Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
ROSENBERG, N. (1994). Exploring the Black Box: 
Technology, Economics, and History, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, England.
166
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2014, Volume 9, Issue 3
ROY, S., Sivakumar, K., and Wilkinson, I. F. (2004). Innovation 
generation in supply chain relationships: a conceptual model 
and research propositions. Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 32(1), pp. 61-79.
SCHEWE, G. (1996). Imitation as a strategic option for 
external acquisition of technology. Journal of Engineering 
and Technology Management, 13(1), pp. 55-82.
TEECE, D. J. (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: the 
nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise 
performance. Strategic management journal, 28(13), pp. 
1319-1350.
TEECE, D. J., Pisano, G., and Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic 
capabilities and strategic management. Strategic management 
journal, 18(7), pp. 509-533.
VON HIPPEL, E. (1988). The Sources of Innovation. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
WANG, C. L., Ahmed, P. K. (2007). Dynamic capabilities: 
A review and research agenda. International Journal of 
Management Reviews, 9(1), pp. 31-51.
ZOLLO, M., Winter, S. G. (2002). Deliberate learning and 
the evolution of dynamic capabilities. Organization science, 
13(3), pp. 339-351. 
167
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2014, Volume 9, Issue 3
Annex 1. STI cooperation between Russian and foreign corporations. Source: ISSEK/HSE
Russian 
SOE
R&D partners Form of cooperation Project details
Gazprom Wintershall Holding AG (BASF 
subsidiary, Germany)
Joint venture with  
Gazprom mining Urengoi Ltd 
(Achimgaz)
Commercial mining and production of natural 
gas and condensate from the Achimov layers 
(since 2008) 
Statoil (Norway)
Total SA (French Group)
Joint venture (Shtokman  
Development AG)
Development of the Shtokman offshore 
gas-condensate field (In August 2012 Statoil 
exited from the project)
Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands, 
Great Britain), Mitsui, Mitsubishi 
(Japan)
Joint venture (Sakhalin Energy) The offshore extraction of hydrocarbons 
Sakhalin-2 (since 2006). 
Russian-German Energy Agency 
RUDEA (Germany)
Long-term agreement with 
Gazpromenergosberezhenie 
and JSC INTER RAO UES in 
the field of energy  
conservation and efficiency
Construction of new and reconstruction of 
existing boilers, generating stations, thermal 
and electrical networks, infrastructure facilities 
using advanced German technologies as well as 
Russian equipment, materials and services
AvtoVAZ TRW Automotive Gmbh  
(Germany)
Тakata-Petri AG (Germany, Japan)
Robert Bosch GmbH (Germany)
Agreement
Protocol on technical  
cooperation
The projects with TRW Automotive Gmbh and 
Takata-Petri AG is related to automobile safety 
systems, and the project with Robert Bosch 






Agreement Purchase of aircraft, system components and 
equipment on a regular basis
Flight simulator producers:
CAE (Canada)
RP Aero Systems (UK)
Agreement Purchase of flight simulators for Aeroflot 
Aviation School
Lufthansa Technik (Germany) Five-year contract (since 
2009)
Technical support and maintenance of the 
Aeroflot aircraft 
Suppliers of IT solutions:
Lufthansa Systems (Germany), SAP 
(Germany)




Siemens (Germany) Joint venture  
(Ural locomotives)
Joint engineering and manufacturing of electric 
trains and electric freight locomotives
Alstom (France) Joint venture (TRTrans) Manufacturing of electric passenger trains
Tatravagonka 
(Slovakia)
Joint venture with Trans-
maschholding (Transmasch)
Manufacturing of flat wagons for carrying 
large-tonnage containers and of multifunctional 
covered trucks of new type
Bombardier (Canada) Joint venture (ELTEZA) Manufacturing of systems of railroad  
automation and telemechanics 
Finmeccanica (Italy) Memorandum of  
understanding and roadmap
Modernization of automatic train control 
systems
MTU Friedrichshafen GmbH 
(Germany)
Joint venture with  
Transmaschholding
Manufacturing of diesel engines of new  
generation
Knorr-Bremse (Germany) Joint venture with JSC ‘Federal 
Freight’ (a subsidiary of  
Russian Railways)
Manufacturing and maintenance of brake  
equipment for locomotives and other rail 
transport
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